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The prospects of deliberative global
governance in the G20: legitimacy,
accountability, and public contestation
STEVEN SLAUGHTER
Abstract. This article contends that the ‘G’ system struggles to play a legitimate and effective
role in global governance and argues that the G20 could play a important role if the forum
was more publically accountable. This article argues that because of increasing forms of public
contestation, the broadening agenda of the G8 and G20 and the uncertain status of global
cooperation, that the legitimacy of the ‘G’ system is being questioned. As such, it is appropriate
to consider deliberative avenues whereby public views could be considered by the G20 in a
systematic way to foster forms of accountability. This consideration is animated by deliberative
democracy theory and republican theory which advance a normative agenda which seeks to
transform governance structures by enhancing the role of deliberation and public reasoning
in political life. The article outlines the development of the ‘G’ system’s legitimacy, considers
possible modes of accountability and public involvement with respect to the G20 and examines
the implications of more formalised public deliberation with respect to the G20.
Steven Slaughter is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University,
Melbourne, Australia. His main publications are Liberty Beyond Neo-liberalism: A Republican
Critique of Liberal Governance in a Globalising Age (2005) and Globalisation and Citizenship:
The Transnational Challenge (co-edited with Wayne Hudson 2007). His research interests
include globalisation, global governance, and international political theory.
In recent decades there have been mounting questions about the legitimacy of pre-
vailing forms of global governance and whether and to what degree individuals
should be involved in global governance. The main questions have been whether the
prevailing forms of cooperation and governance have been effective in managing the
economic dimensions of globalisation, effective in addressing the social dimensions of
globalisation – especially in respect to poverty and ecological degradation, and
whether the organs of global governance have considered the voices of those affected
by the decisions of these organs. The G8 (the Group of Eight) and the G20 (the
Group of Twenty) forums of governance have been at the centre of these issues.1
The ‘G’ system has its origins in the 1970s when the leading industrialised democracies
created the G6, G7, then the G8 as an annual forum for executive level deliberations
to manage emerging forms of globalisation. The G20 has its origins as a forum for
finance ministers in the late 1990s in response to the instability in the global financial
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1 A. Cooper, ‘The G20 as an Improvised Crisis Committee and/or a Contested ‘‘Steering Committee’’ for
the World’, International Affairs, 86:3 (2010), p. 742.
system. The role of the G20 has continued to grow and formally replaced the G8 as
the preeminent site for executive level deliberation in 2009.
This article contends that the G20 struggles to play a legitimate and effective role
in global governance. While the ‘G’ system was originally designed to operate outside
the formal deliberations of established multilateral diplomacy, public contestation
has become an unavoidable element of contemporary global governance.2 Further-
more, the ‘G’ system has continued to grow in significance. While the ‘G’ system
originally focused on economic issues, it has increasingly addressed a range of non-
economic issues such as terrorism, global warming, and global health.3 Despite this
significance, and despite demonstrating signs of effectiveness in response to the
Global Financial Crisis, the future of the G20 is far from certain in an environment
lacking the galvanising need to collaborate to address an immediate global financial
crisis or widespread willingness of member states to address broader global social
issues.4 This article argues that because of these increasing forms of public contesta-
tion, the broadening agenda of the G8 and G20, and the uncertain status of global
cooperation, that the legitimacy of the ‘G’ system is being called into question. The
increasing impact of the ‘G’ system on individuals around the world is leading to a
growing sentiment that the G8 and now the G20 should be involved in addressing
global issues. The argument here is that the G20 could play an important role if the
forum was more publically accountable. Greater avenues for public participation and
accountability would strengthen the public legitimacy of the G20 and increase its
capacity to be a forum that can address global problems and manage transnational
connections in a productive fashion. As such, it is appropriate to consider delibera-
tive avenues whereby public views could be considered by the G20 in a systematic
way to foster forms of accountability.
This consideration is animated by critical deliberative democratic theory and
the associated theories of neo-roman republicanism and discursive democracy which
advance a normative agenda which seeks to transform governance structures by
enhancing the role of deliberation and public reasoning in political life.5 This norma-
tive consideration is also inherently pragmatic in that it considers the practical obstacles
and limits to deliberation and public participation in specific concrete political situa-
tions. Critical deliberative theorists focused on global governance tend to work with
the institutions ‘we have’ rather than argue for grand systems of global representative
democracy so as to identify possible pathways and latent potential for political
change.6 The question here is how deliberation could constitute forms of public
reflection in respect to the G20. While it is the case that the G20, like most forms of
global governance, has a ‘multiplicity of audiences’, the argument here is that the
G20 could act as what deliberative theorist Randall Germain terms an ‘institutional
2 Robert O’Brien, et al. (eds) Contesting Global Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and
Global Social Movements (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
3 Hugo Dobson, The Group of 7/8 (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 60.
4 Financial Times, ‘A Bad Year for Global Governance’ (29 December 2010).
5 James Brassett and William Smith, ‘Deliberation and Global Governance: Liberal, Cosmopolitan
and Critical Perspectives’, Ethics and International Affairs, 22:1 (2008), pp. 69–92; Randall Germain,
‘Financial Governance and Transnational Deliberative Democracy’, Review of International Studies,
36:2 (2010), pp. 493–509; Philip Petitt, ‘Deliberative Democracy, the Discursive Dilemma, and Repub-
lican Theory’, in James. Fishkin and Peter. Laslett (eds), Debating Deliberative Democracy (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2003), pp. 138–62; John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Global Politics: Discourse and Democracy
in a Divided World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006).
6 Brassett and Smith, ‘Deliberation and Global Governance’, p. 84.
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anchor’;7 a locus that creates public spheres constituted by deliberation between
member states of the G20, domestic societies of those member states, and trans-
national civil society. This article advances the idea of deliberative accountability
as an institutional framework for a forum like the G20 to be a place where leaders
give reasons for joint declarations and decisions as well as being responsive to various
public inputs. The concept of accountability is an appropriate mechanism to demon-
strate how deliberation relates to legitimacy and authority in respect to multiple
publics.
The argument that deliberation and accountability will enhance the legitimacy
and effectiveness of the G20 will proceed through four steps. First, the development
of the ‘G’ system in light of the context of its legitimacy and the increasing role of
NGOs and social movements will be considered. Second, possible modes of public
accountability will be explored. Third, a deliberative conception of accountability
will be developed and the key theoretical problems of more formalised public delibera-
tion will be considered. Fourth, some of the practical problems of public accountability
with respect to the legitimacy of the G20 will be scrutinised.
The ‘G’ system and legitimacy
The ‘G’ system of forums are reoccurring diplomatic summits involving the executive
leaders of member states and key International Organisations (IOs). It is important
from the outset to indicate that the ‘G’ system of forums have been established
outside the normal protocols of international law and have no constitution, ongoing
secretariat or budget, and thus no capacity to act independently of its member states.
As such, these meetings involve dialogue regarding issues of mutual concern with
each meeting being chaired by the country hosting the summit which also has the
responsibility for setting out an agenda in consultation with other members. The
leaders of member states of the G20 articulate a consensus in a formal communique´
issued at the end of meetings in the form of a broad strategy that may be imple-
mented in the policies of member states or IOs. The initial focus of the ‘G’ system
was upon the increasing impact of economic interdependence during the 1970s –
especially the macroeconomic impact of the oil crises. This role has encompassed
addressing the policy implications of economic interdependence as well as addressing
public expectations and fears regarding interdependence and globalisation.8 As such,
the G7/8’s management of global integration encompasses both the policy coordina-
tion of its political leaders and efforts to publicly legitimise economic globalisation.
The ‘G’ system plays a series of significant roles in global governance. First, the
‘G’ system is an executive level forum that can swiftly coordinate international
responses to urgent global economic problems by acting as a forum for ‘crisis
diplomacy’.9 This is evident in that the G system has been rising in significance
within the structures of global governance and has increasingly played the coordinat-
ing role of being the ‘plate spinner’ which acts as a forum that directs other bodies
7 Germain, ‘Financial Governance’, p. 501.
8 Nicholas Bayne, ‘The G8 and the Globalisation Challenge’, Paper presented at the Academic Sym-
posium G8 2000 (Okinawa, 2000).
9 Cooper, ‘The G20’, p. 747.
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like the UN, WTO, IMF, and World Bank.10 This is evident in the way the G20 has
become the central body for responding to the Global Financial Crisis in 2008 and
2009, especially in the form of G20 efforts to coordinate new financial resources
from its member states to the IMF in 2009.11 In addition to providing the back-
ground cooperation required for globalisation to exist, the G system also provides
an executive level forum to discuss the immediate implications of ‘common systemic
problems’.12 The G20 forum of finance ministers and central bank governors
emerged as a response to the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s, and the develop-
ment of the G20 world leader’s forum was a response to the Global Financial Crisis.
This demonstrates that the G system is adaptable to changing dynamics in the global
economy. The development of the G20 also shows a willingness to include emerging
economies that are rising in economic and political significance.13 Nevertheless, it
must be emphasised that across the history of the ‘G’ system – including the newly
formed G20 forum – ‘the majority of regulatory power and decision-making’
remains with member states.14
Second, although it is often decried as little more than a glorified photo oppor-
tunity, the G8 and the G20 represent significant sites for ‘informal’ consensus
formation by participating leaders. In ideological terms these processes of consensus
formation are especially important because while the G8 and G20 attempt to coordinate
policies among member states – often with mixed results and various disagreements
and tensions – it also inculcates states and institutions into ideologies and discourses
which emphasise capitalist and neo-liberal principles.15 In addition, authors from the
perspective of critical political economy make the point that there are hegemonic
connections between the G8 and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), both
in the terms of the ‘jurisdiction’ of these institutions as well as their personnel.16 Cox
refers to the institutions that support global capitalism as undertaking a ‘transnational
process of consensus formation among the official caretakers of the global economy’.17
In this view the ‘G’ system of institutions is a powerful hub of policy coordination and
consensus building involving the leaders of powerful states. Questions remain as to the
power of dominant states like the US in the G20, but the broadening membership of
the G20 points to new forms of cooperation paralleling the dominance of the US and
transnational capitalism.18
Third, the ‘G’ system also embodies a site for institution building and adaptation.
During the 1990s, the ‘G’ system engaged in a process of international institutional
reform. The G8’s internal institutional adaptation led to the creation of the G20. This
adaption was aimed at responding to emerging problems and to promote ‘financial
10 Dobson, The Group of 7/8, p. 89.
11 Cooper, ‘The G20’, p. 741.
12 M. Beeson and S. Bell, ‘The G20 and International Economic Governance: Hegemony, Collectivism or
Both?’, Global Governance, 15:1 (2009), p. 67.
13 Cooper, ‘The G20’, p. 743.
14 Michael Hammer, ‘The time is now’, One World Trust Briefing Paper, 118 (2009), p. 1. See also Dobson,
‘The Group of 7/8’, p. 34.
15 Beeson and Bell, ‘The G20 and International Economic Governance’, p. 69.
16 Robert Cox, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 301.
17 Ibid.
18 Beeson and Bell, ‘The G20 and International Economic Governance’, pp. 81–2. See also Cooper, ‘The
G20’.
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stability’.19 The G8 sought to head off criticism that it is an unrepresentative clique
by developing the G20 forum of finance ministers and central bank governors that
was formally created at the 25 September 1999 meeting of the G7 Finance Ministers.
According to the G7 Finance Ministers, the G20 was created ‘as a new mechanism
for informal dialogue in the framework of the Bretton Woods institutional system, to
broaden the dialogue on key economic and financial policy issues among systemically
significant economies and to promote cooperation to achieve stable and sustainable
world growth that benefits all’.20 While the G20 finance ministers have met regularly
since 1999, in 2008 the executive leaders of the G20 countries met for this first time
and in 2009 it was announced that the G20 had replaced the G8 as the central forum
for executive level deliberations. This demonstrates that dominant states regarded
prevailing institutional forums – including the G8 – as inadequate,21 as well as
demonstrating a form of institutional flexibility that other international institutions
do not possess.
Lastly, while the ‘G’ system has a clear focus on economic issues it also has
addressed a range of non-economic issues ranging from terrorism, global warming,
and global health – with mixed results. Despite this broadening agenda, the ‘G’ system
has played an important role in articulating and legitimating neo-liberal principles in
light of its primary focus on global financial issues. However, the potential of the G20
to address an array of issues broader than promoting global capitalism, or coordinat-
ing responses to economic crises, points to the potential significance of creating and
sustaining a body that plays a coordinating role in global governance that extends to
social issues and promotes global public goods. Managing such social issues appears
to be growing in importance not just because such issues have economic implications,
but because addressing these social issues is crucial to the legitimacy of the G20 and
global governance. In practical terms it is important to have an executive level forum
in global governance that considers how different policy regimes intersect.22 This
includes questions regarding how economic policy regimes intersect with environ-
mental and human rights regimes, as well as how the agendas of different inter-
national institutions intersect. There is a sense that the G20 fulfils a glaring gap in
global cooperation. That is, we urgently require an executive level forum that pro-
motes policy coordination which can address and adapt to the world’s economic
and social problems. Indeed the broadening agenda and the expanding membership
of the G system demonstrate that one of the strengths of the G system has been that
it is flexible and adaptive.
Throughout the development of the ‘G’ system there have been questions sur-
rounding the legitimacy and appropriateness of the various forums.23 While the
transformation of the ‘G’ system from the G8 to the G20 is evidence of a considerable
broadening of representation at these executive level forums, questions still persist as
to the legitimacy of ‘G’ system membership and deliberations in light of the alleged
elitism and exclusivity of this system of forums. The legitimacy of the ‘G’ system is
19 John Kirton, What is the G20? Paper presented at an International Think Tank Forum on ‘China in the
Twenty-First Century’ (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1999).
20 G7, ‘Statement of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’, Washington (25 September
1999).
21 Cooper, ‘The G20’, p. 748.
22 Ibid., p. 756.
23 Dobson, ‘The Group of 7/8’, p. 84.
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incongruous. On one hand the ‘G’ system is very much sensitive to its standing
among states – especially when responding to crises there is an awareness of the
importance of including important stakeholders and being seen to be inclusive. The
formation of the G20 demonstrates that the G8 was not deemed legitimate in terms
of membership given that only a small range of states were included. The G20 also
demonstrated that the G8 did not represent enough states to be able to manage
globalisation given the changing balance of power and wealth evident in rise of
China, India, and other emerging economies. Furthermore some G20 states are
involved in ‘outreach’ programmes whereby member states of the G20 consult with
non-G20 members in their region.24 However, on the other hand the ‘G’ system has
traditionally demonstrated little systematic regard for the public opinion of member
states or transnational NGOs. Furthermore, the G20 has offered few structures for
public engagement of the public’s of member states or NGOs.25 In short, avenues of
public participation, consultation, or input into the ‘G’ system have been minimal.
Much of the issue of legitimacy relates to the question of what public or com-
munity is an actor meant to be acceptable and appropriate to.26 If an institution
lacks legitimacy, ‘then their claims to authority are unfounded’ and the operation of
the institution does not have support by the relevant actors.27 A lack of legitimacy
for an organisation can produce a range of social costs which can adversely affect the
power, effectiveness, and efficiency of an organisation.28 Legitimacy is an ‘inherently
social’ phenomena which requires interaction and dialogue where ‘for an actor or
institution to be judged legitimate, its identity, interests, or practices must resonate
with values considered normative by other actors within their realm of political
action’.29 In world politics the question of who are the relevant actors or con-
stituency is not given nor fixed. We could speak of the international legitimacy of
an international organisation with respect to the states in the international system,
and public legitimacy with respect to the public of states that create and support the
organisation in question, or with respect to the networks of NGOs and social move-
ments that comprise an emerging global public sphere. The importance of various
constituencies of legitimacy for a given institution also can change over time.30 While
international legitimacy and public legitimacy are crucial to organs of global gover-
nance, the importance of the latter form of legitimation has risen in significance as
people are increasingly questioning the legitimacy and appropriateness of the deci-
sions and power of international organisations,31 evident in the high profile public
protests against the WTO, IMF, G8, and G20.
These dynamics of the public contestation of global governance are especially
important in respect to the G8 and G20. Not only has the ‘G’ system been rising in
significance within the structures of global governance but it has also increasingly
24 A. Cooper and C. Bradford, The G20 and the Post-Crisis Economic Order (Ontario: The Centre for
International Governance Innovation, 2010), p. 11.
25 Ibid.
26 Ian Clark, ‘Legitimacy in a Global Order’, Review of International Studies, 29 (2003), p. 95; and
Jonathan Symons, ‘The legitimation of international organisations: examining the identity of the com-
munities that grant legitimacy’, Review of International Studies, 37.SI (2011).
27 Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’, Ethics
and International Affairs, 20:4 (2006), p. 407.
28 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘International Crises of Legitimacy’, International Politics, 44 (2007), pp. 163–5.
29 Ibid., pp. 171–2.
30 Symons, ‘The legitimation of international organisations’, pp. 14–15.
31 Ibid.; Clark, ‘Legitimacy’, p. 95.
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played the coordinating role of ‘plate spinner’ which directs other global governance
organs. As such, G8 meetings since the late 1990s and now G20 meetings have become
beacons for civil society activism of the anti capitalist movement and beyond. Fur-
thermore, the rising public awareness of the G20 has been met with relatively few
avenues for participation or engagement with the G20. Thus the growing significance
and power of global governance forums like the G8 and G20 point to a fundamental
‘democratic deficit’ existing in the sense that is unclear how accountable and responsive
these bodies are to the people affected by their decisions.32 The growing significance of
NGOs and social movements is a response to this representation and accountability
deficit and the lack of existing avenues for participation in global governance. Not
only are states and IOs not alone in making political decisions, they increasingly
have to interact with NGOs in order to work effectively and legitimately.33
These forms of public contestation are not only about the legitimacy of global
governance bodies like the G8 or G20, but more profoundly, the question of what
principles of legitimacy should exist in global politics. As Ian Clark indicates in
respect to the politics of resistance and governance, ‘actors within the global order
are searching for, and competing about, the principles of legitimacy that deserve
respect’.34 Crucially, the participation of NGOs and individuals are significantly
involved in this ongoing process of legitimation. The significance of NGOs are thus
both a symptom of the questionable legitimacy of global governance and one im-
portant means scholars suggest the legitimacy of global governance could be actually
enhanced. The argument developed here is that the public legitimacy of the G20 is
important and this is significantly influenced and conditioned by the existence and
operation of NGOs and social movements within member states and in transnational
civil society. Tightly wound up with the public legitimacy of institutions like the G8
or G20 is the question of accountability: how should the G20 be answerable for its
actions and to whom should the G20 be responsible to? As such, accountability is
emerging as one of the ‘principles of legitimacy’ in contemporary global politics.
Accountability and the G20
However, accountability with respect to global governance is extremely difficult to
achieve because of the decentralised nature of international politics.35 Nevertheless,
Robert Keohane claims that, despite this, efforts need to be mounted to promote
accountability where possible and ‘we need urgently to seek innovative ways to hold
potential abusers of power, at a global level, to account; otherwise, we risk dis-
crediting global governance and fostering a reversion to national sovereignty, with
disastrous consequences for cooperation, for peace, and for our own prosperity and
personal security’.36 The accountability of global governance bodies is conditioned
by the question of who should they be accountable to. As is the case with legitimacy
in global politics, the actual constituency that forums like the G20 should be
32 David Held, ‘Reframing Global Governance: Apocalypse soon or reform!’, New Political Economy,
11:2 (2006), p. 166.
33 M. Blagescu, L. de las Casas, and R. Lloyd, Pathways to Accountability: The GAP Framework (London:
One World Trust, 2005), p. 13.
34 Clark, ‘Legitimacy’, p. 94.
35 Robert Keohane, ‘Accountability in World Politics’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 29:2 (2006), p. 78.
36 Ibid.
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accountable to is not clear. Keohane indentifies two forms of accountability in this
respect: the ‘internal accountability’ of an organisation to the people who created
the organisation (that is, the shareholders in a case of business), and the ‘external
accountability’ to those affected by the actions of an organisations (the stakeholders
in a case of business).37 In articulating these forms of accountability, Keohane
emphasises that accountability is essentially a ‘power relationship’ where people
constrain the authority and discretion of an organisation.38 Keohane’s view of
accountability, although well developed, appears to be too limited in some respects.
The demarcation between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ accountability appears to not
map well with the ambiguity of these categories in global politics. Keohane’s earlier
articulation of ‘transnational accountability’ is a potentially important qualification
which unpacks the nature of ‘external’ accountability to focus upon the role of
NGOs in prompting accountability.39
Following on from Keohane, there are three forms of public constituency to
whom G20 deliberations could be seen to be accountable. First, in a direct sense
we could say that there is a strict sense of national accountability where individual
leaders of the G20 should be accountable to the public’s of their own states. This
corresponds with Robert Keohane’s conception of ‘internal’ accountability where it
is the public that delegates responsibility to leaders within the G20 and in doing so
develops a formalised sense that their voices be systematically considered. This could
be through the electoral processes of the state or through parliament oversight of the
foreign affairs functions of government. Even this conception of formal accountabil-
ity is problematic in terms of actual effective accountability with respect to the G20,
as will be discussed. However, an even larger problem exists with this formal view
given that the influence of the ‘G’ systems deliberations has an impact on people
beyond just the participating leader’s states.
Thus a second broader sense of cosmopolitan accountability could be said to
exist where the constituency of the global governance organ is defined by impact
rather than formal responsibility to a particular community. This relates to Keohane’s
conception of ‘external’ accountability. The cosmopolitan sense of accountability seeks
to create procedures to ensure that deliberations by leaders in the G20 are responsive
to those actually and foreseeably impacted by its determinations. This requires devel-
oping mechanisms for a direct voice for people excluded from national modes of
accountability. As Daniele Archibugi claims in regards to the G20 meeting in 2009:
How does that one third of the world population whose state representatives have not even
been invited to the Summit feel about it? A good 173 countries in the world have been left out
and can only wait and see what is decided in London. We are talking about one third of the
world population which has all the problems of the other two thirds and often many more, but
in this case have no voice.40
It must be stressed that the G20 is aware of these global ramifications and does have
a global intent. The 2009 G20 London Summit Leaders’ Statement claims that ‘our
global plan for recovery must have at its heart the needs and jobs of hard-working
37 Ibid., p. 79.
38 Ibid. See also Robert Keohane, ‘Global Governance and Democratic Accountability’, in David. Held
and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (eds), Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance (London: Polity
Press, 2003), pp. 130–59.
39 Ibid., p. 143.
40 Daniele Archibugi, ‘The G20 ought to be increased to 6 Billion’, openDemocracy (London, 2009).
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families, not just in developed countries but in emerging markets and the poorest
countries of the world too; and must reflect the interests, not just of today’s popula-
tion, but of future generations too’.41
Nevertheless, accountability is not only about intent. Rather it refers fundamen-
tally to whether there are institutions and procedures that enable stakeholders to
promote responsibility on the part of the agency in question. Consequently, the ‘G’
system has manifestly failed to move toward this form of accountability given the
exclusions that Archibugi points to. This exclusion significantly affects the capacity
of global governance organs to be effective at promoting the public goods that the
communique´s of the G8 and G20 regularly express. So when the G20 makes promises
in regards to Africa, for example, the people of Africa have no formal way of
demanding that the G20 be responsible for ensuring that these undertakings are
upheld, or be responsive to input by African’s for future promises by the G20.
Nevertheless, there are apparent problems with efforts to institutionalise cosmopolitan
accountability. There are questions about the global democratic and legal institutions
required to give the world’s population input into bodies like the G20.42 Very quickly
it becomes apparent that the only totally inclusive and cosmopolitan forum would be a
‘G192’ or even a ‘G6 billion’ as mischievously proposed by Archibugi.43 Also when we
consider the underlying question of legitimacy, it is the case that it appears ‘premature
to claim that IOs require mass legitimacy’.44
Thus a third account of accountability exists with respect to Keohane’s concept
of transnational accountability. In this form, NGOs and social movements within
transnational civil society appear to be the via media between the strict accountability
of national political processes, and the idea that people affected by an institution
should have a direct form of accountability. NGOs and transnational activism pro-
vides some form of proxy representative accountability – even if the representative
function is not formally sanctioned by the public in states around the world.45
NGOs have various techniques to ensure that states live up to promises that they
undertake and ‘name and shame’ states to live up to prevailing norms articulated in
international law and human rights agreements.46 Consequently they can influence
the legitimacy of states and international forums. Importantly, these actors must
deplore ethical and moral argumentation to promote legal and political change
because they have few other forms of power.47 There are questions about how reliably
and consistently NGOs can represent groups or causes around the world. As Clifford
Bob indicates there is a range of factors influencing why NGOs support particular
causes but not others and there are questions as to whether the strategic interests of
NGOs distort those causes they purport to represent.48 While they provide no formal
mechanisms whereby people can have an official voice in the operation and outcomes
41 G20, ‘London Summit Leaders’ Statement’ (2 April 2009), para. 3.
42 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).
43 Archibugi, ‘The G20’.
44 Symons, ‘The legitimation of international organisations’, p. 7.
45 John Dryzek and Simon Niemeyer, ‘Discursive Representation’, American Political Science Review,
102:4 (2008), p. 481.
46 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International
Politics (Cornell, Cornell University Press, 1998), chap. 1. See also Jan Aart Scholte, ‘Civil Society
and Democracy in Global Governance’, Global Governance, 8:3 (2002), pp. 281–304.
47 Keohane, ‘Global Governance’, p. 148.
48 Clifford Bob, ‘Merchants of Morality’, Foreign Policy, 129 (Mar./Apr. 2002), pp. 36–45.
Deliberative global governance in the G20 79
of global governance bodies, they nevertheless provide one of the few ways to prompt
leaders in forums like the G20 to be responsible to those affected by its deliberations.
Deliberative accountability and the G20
While the question of who the G20 should be accountable to remains challenging, it
is important to conceptualise accountability in a broader sense. So far accountability
has been stated here in primarily a disciplinary sense. But there are other ways to
systematise accountability which rest on a different conception of what is expected
or required from the G20 forum in the sense of having a different expectation of
what the G20 should be accountable for. While this article has argued that account-
ability is emerging as a crucial element of legitimacy, there are questions as to what
forms of accountability are appropriate to ensure that the G20 is legitimate and
effective. Given that the G20 is not a formal international organisation which
possesses a unified agency but rather is a forum of leaders from member states, it is
ultimately unhelpful to claim that the G20 should be accountable for its decisions
and actions in judicial, electoral or even moral terms. As such, this article contends
that Keohane’s theory of accountability overemphasises the disciplinary nature of
accountability and underplays the communicative aspects of accountability.
The alternative position argued for here is to develop the communicative and
deliberative aspects of accountability. This is an argument to develop a form of
deliberative accountability where there is the understanding that deliberations between
the G20 leaders are sincere, transparent, and responsive to public inputs. To claim
accountability of the G20 is to expect that the G20 is a suitable locus – a public
place – where the leaders of the states involved can be systematically accountable
for their declarations and that reasons are given for determinations. This means that
the expectation of G20 summits is that the leaders involved are anticipated to give
public reasons for their decisions, be responsive to public inputs from various sources
and make reasonable efforts to follow up on their declarations with political action.
This is where the reasonable belief could be formed that the joint declarations are
authentic and transparent precursors to reflective political action rather than being a
secretive or meaningless ‘talk fest’. Given that the G20, like its predecessors is about
developing ideas and joint strategic understandings rather than binding decisions or
tactical questions of implementation,49 the idea here is to reconsider the nature of the
deliberations undertaken.
Efforts to develop deliberative accountability within the G20 rest on the notion
that the existing G20 is essentially a deliberative institution; it is just that deliberation
is currently narrowly limited to leaders and their advisors. While the G system has
always been a ‘state centric’ forum,50 the argument here is to widen this narrow
form of deliberation and transform the G20 from being an executive forum to a
publically engaged forum. Given the deliberative instinct which underpins this under-
standing of accountability, there are some practical measures that would engage
world leaders in the G20 with the constituencies they represent or affect. A minimal
way of expanding accountability would be to ensure that the communique´s of the
49 Cooper, ‘The G20’, p. 756.
50 Ibid., p. 744.
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G20 be treated more seriously by parliaments and parliament committees of member
states as a way of holding governments to account for promises undertaken by leaders.
A more responsive way of obtaining a higher level of accountability would be to
enable citizen oversight panels or empowering NGOs to report on the contrast
between the undertakings at G20 forums and actual government action and to explain
the consequences of G20 decisions. This would involve G20 leaders responding to
these public inputs. This form of accountability would go some way to make executive
leaders take the G20 more seriously as a forum for policy consideration and may
require a more formalised secretariat to systematise public inputs so as to enable
world leaders to respond. Whatever the institutional format, public participation
should be as pre-emptive as possible and not just retrospective, thereby ensuring
that public input is dynamic and not merely a rubber stamp.
The key expected outcome of deliberative forms of accountability and responsive-
ness is enhancing the capacity of G20 leaders to learn. The practical contention that
accountability is best understood in terms of responsiveness is evident in the work of
the One World Trust – a think tank operating out of the United Kingdom. As the
One World Trust indicates:
First and foremost accountability is about engaging with, and being responsive to, stake-
holders; taking into consideration their needs and views in decision-making and providing an
explanation as to why they were or were not taken on board. In this way, accountability is less
a mechanism of control and more a process for learning. Being accountable is about being
open with stakeholders, engaging with them in an ongoing dialogue and learning from the
interaction. Accountability can generate ownership of decisions and projects and enhance the
sustainability of activities. Ultimately it provides a pathway to better performance.51
This draws a clear connection between legitimacy, accountability, and effectiveness.
The One World Trust has created the Global Accountability Project (GAP) frame-
work and applied this framework to a range of NGOs, IOs, and TNCs.52 This frame-
work divides accountability into four dimensions required for accountability to be
robust. These elements include: ‘transparency’ (where an agency ‘provides stake-
holders with the information they need to participate in the decisions that affect
them’), ‘participation’ (where an agency includes stakeholders in the decision-making
process – not just the implementation of decisions, ‘evaluation’ (where an agency
includes the views of stakeholders in determining the success of an agency’s agenda),
and ‘complaint and response mechanisms’ (where an agency has procedures for
querying decisions and responding to grievances).53 These elements have the capacity
to enhance the capacity of leaders to learn rather than restrain.
In addition to providing a context where institutional learning can take place,
this conception of accountability also directly feeds into strengthening the legitimacy
of institutions that systematically attempt to be responsive to the concerns of their
constituents. Reus-Smit indicates that when the legitimacy of an institution is in
question – when there is a crisis of legitimacy – this can only be rectified by social
and political interaction which involves a ‘recalibration’ of its legitimacy.54 This
‘requires some form of communicative reconciliation of the actor’s or institution’s
social identity, interests, or practices with the normative expectations of other actors
51 Blagescu, et al, ‘Pathways’, p. 11.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., pp. 23–4.
54 Reus-Smit, ‘International Crises’, p. 172.
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within its realm of political action’.55 This demonstrates the crucial importance of
communication and deliberation to legitimacy. Moreover, this also points to the
importance of systematic processes of accountability for the ongoing recalibration
of an institution’s legitimacy. Developing systematic processes for accountability is
especially important for democratic states because, ‘in a democratic era, multilateral
institutions will only thrive if they are viewed as legitimate by democratic publics’.56
The contention that accountability is best understood in terms of responsiveness
rather than responsibility or representativeness is drawn from deliberative perspec-
tives on democracy and governance. In order for the G20 to be publically responsive,
the political practice of deliberation is crucial. While there are differing accounts
surrounding the notion of deliberative democracy and governance – one ‘common
idea is that public deliberation – public reasoning about issues of shared concern –
should be one of the principal ingredients of political life’.57 Deliberative approaches
disassociate deliberation from formal structures of electoral democracy and focus
upon the substance and openness of dialogue rather than the institutions in which
deliberation takes place. Critical deliberative democratic theory and the associated
theories of neo-Roman republicanism and discursive democracy argue for the develop-
ment of a political culture which enables individual citizens to engage in wide-ranging
deliberation about public life with others, in a way in which their views and opinions
can be modified through such public reasoning and consequently influence political
decision-making.58 Such theory contrasts with the delimited nature of liberal reformist
stands of deliberation in the sense that critical approaches seek to widen the inclusivity
of public participation, broaden the array of issues subject to democratic concern and
ensure that public deliberation will be a significant part of decision-making processes.59
Critical approaches also emphasise the importance and possibility that citizens can
radically transform political practice because critical deliberation ‘allows for the
transformation of their views, their institutions, and their social contexts’.60
Critical deliberative democratic theory seeks to shift global governance away
from technocratic models of governance that comprise a narrow band of experts
and elected officials and enable transformations in the institutions and ideas compris-
ing global governance.61 This includes efforts to include a wider variety of ideas and
voices which encompasses the possibility for transnational forms of deliberation
which include all people affected by global decision-making processes. Furthermore,
critical approaches seek to both develop a multiplicity of different perspectives in
decision-making and widen the range of issues subject to democratic concern. As such,
critical approaches seek to include wide ranging deliberation about global economic
issues rather than leave these issues to experts and officials from powerful states.
These wider and deeper forms of transnational deliberation seek to not just make
effective decisions and strengthen the public legitimacy of decision-making structures,
55 Ibid.
56 Buchanan and Keohane, ‘Legitimacy’, p. 407.
57 Brassett and Smith, ‘Deliberation and Global Governance’, p. 72 and Dryzek, Deliberative Global
Politics.
58 Geoffrey Stokes, ‘Critical theories of Deliberative Democracy and the Problem of Citizenship’, in Ethan
J. Leib and Baogang He (eds), Search for Deliberative Democracy in China (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2006), p. 66; and Pettit, ‘Deliberative Democracy’, pp. 139–40
59 Stokes, ‘Critical theories’, p. 54.
60 Ibid., p. 66.
61 Germain, ‘Financial Governance’, p. 498.
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but also create more reflexive and inclusive forms of governance.62 Many deliberative
democratic theorists contend that this form of deliberation can work beyond national
forms of democracy – because of the existence of NGOs and social movements as
dialogic agencies.63 Consequently, critical deliberative democratic theory emphasises
the dialogical role and capacities of NGOs and other forms of transnational activism
and communication.
This form of deliberation is crucial to effective accountability and informs the
account of deliberative accountability argued for in this article. Underpinning account-
ability of this kind is an underlying ethos of deliberation which includes a public
dispensation to question authority and contest decisions which are not supported
with well developed reasons.64 Accountability is crucial to non-arbitrary governance.
Indeed, the elements of accountability articulated by the One World Trust are all
important.65 Transparency, participation, evaluation, and complaint and response
mechanisms are all required in order for forms of global governance to be responsive
to its membership and to those it affects. But these elements require a context of
public deliberation. In order for accountability to be robust there must be a culture
of public participation and engagement where there is mutual acknowledgment by
the public and actors within organs like the G20 that deliberation will be taken
seriously and reasons will be given for the making of decisions. Consequently, for
this form of deliberative accountability to exist there needs to be systematic processes
of communication but there does not have to be formal electoral democratic struc-
tures at a global level.
Deliberation and the possibilities of G20 accountability
While deliberative democracy does not demand electoral democratic structures it
does dramatically recast the expectations we can make of global governance. Indeed,
in the deliberative democracy literature there is the argument that we are witnessing
an incipient process of transnational democratisation. While it is the case that the
prospects for electoral democracy at a global level are weak, there are signs of emerg-
ing forms of public engagement with global and regional forms of governance.66
These forms of engagement are democratic in a broader sense of attempting to moderate
and hold authority to account.67 Efforts to promote deliberative accountability with
respect to the G20 could be seen to be consonant with this development. However,
the approach of critical deliberative democracy and its associates also focuses upon
the more immediate and instrumental task of democratising global governance
bodies so that they make better decisions.68 This literature attempts to offer solutions
to problems of efforts to promote greater accountability. Even if we could enact
transnational forms of accountability, there are theoretical questions of how the
62 Stokes, ‘Critical theories’, p. 55.
63 Ibid., p. 68. See also Dryzek Deliberative Global Politics.
64 Pettit, ‘Deliberative Democracy’, pp. 152–3.
65 Blagescu, et al., ‘Pathways’, p. 23.
66 John Dryzek, ‘Global Democratization: Soup, Society, or System?’, Ethics & International Affairs, 25:2
(2011), pp. 211–34. See also Robert Goodin, ‘Global Democracy: In the Beginning’, International
Theory, 2:2 (2010), pp. 175–209.
67 Goodin, ‘Global Democracy’, p. 179.
68 Brassett and Smith, ‘Deliberation and Global Governance’ and Germain, ‘Financial Governance’.
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deliberation would operate. In response to the argument here to promote delibera-
tive accountability with respect to the G20 there are some problems which critical
deliberative democracy and associated theory offer some ways forward.
One procedural problem is how transnational NGOs observing the G20 can
productively interface with democratic systems in nation states. Some deliberative
theory, such as the earlier work of John Dryzek, focuses upon the creation of trans-
national spaces for genuine dialogue which are not necessarily institutionalised or
formally connected to authority.69 In this position the diffuse influence of delibera-
tion is via the discourses within transnational civil society, so national democratic
systems and incipient forms of transnational democracy overlap. This view can be
criticised for not having any systematic means for incorporating citizen views into
global governance or have means by which current international bodies could be
formally accountable for their decisions. Other deliberative scholars emphasise the
importance of having institutions to ensure that deliberation has a focus and the
capacity of being a core decision-making process.70 The question remains how trans-
national actors could interact with national democratic processes.
A republican consideration of this issue sees a productive interface between national
democratic processes and transnational actors. Phillip Pettit, a leading exponent of
neo-republican thought, advances the idea of ‘contestatory democracy’ where citizens
of a putative republican state have both ‘authorial’ and ‘editorial’ powers in relation
to government.71 Authorial power encompasses the public selection of representa-
tives, while editorial power includes measures that keep the actions of government
transparent and accountable in order to promote common interests. Such oversight
would include expected procedures such as freedom of information provisions, a
range of consultative measures that include petitions and public committees, and an
ability to appeal and reshape law via direct referenda. Pettit’s account of contestatory
democracy emphasises the role of deliberation in a republican conception of govern-
ment which considers public issues in a transparent way.72 While republicanism cannot
be seen to animate a global democracy, the republican conception of contestatory
democracy offers grounds to bridge the ‘democratic deficit’ that exists in contem-
porary global governance. Pettit claims that when we look at democracy purely in a
representative sense, the power of international institutions over the democratic state
looks disruptive, but if we look at democracy in a contestatory way we can identify
avenues which extend the opportunities for citizens to hold governments to account.73
Not only would principles of deliberation and contestation be able to extend to
government policies within global governance bodies like the G20, but contestatory
democracy opens up the possibility that citizens could appeal to international forums
like the G20 or transnational NGOs when state leaders fail to uphold their declared
obligations.74
69 Dryzek, Deliberative Global Politics, p. 154.
70 Brassett and Smith, ‘Deliberation and Global Governance’, p. 72. See also Germain, ‘Financial
Governance’, p. 499.
71 Phillip Pettit, ‘Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization’, in Ian Shapiro and Casiano
Hacker-Cordo´n (eds), Democracy’s Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 163–90.
72 Pettit, ‘Deliberative Democracy’.
73 Philip Pettit, ‘Two-dimensional Democracy, National and International’, IILJ Working Paper, 8 (2005),
pp. 14–15.
74 Ibid., pp. 16–20.
84 Steven Slaughter
A second substantive problem is that there are questions as to what voices from
the various public inputs would the G20 actually be responsive to. How significantly
would radical voices from various publics be considered by leaders of the G20? There
are clear reasons to doubt the input of radical voices into the G20 given the G system’s
history of prioritising capitalist and neo-liberal ideas. Nevertheless deliberative
accountability means at minimum there will be reasons given for supporting such
ideas and rejecting anti-capitalist ideas and discourses. It is important to see that
even with respect to national publics, that to the extent that G20 leaders privilege
neo-liberal ideas and not engage with alternatives, that they disenfranchise those
sections of their populations who do not subscribe to those ideas and principles.
Furthermore, while there are critics of neo-liberalism who are not supportive of
G20 directed attempts to stabilise global capitalism, deliberative accountability seeks
to provide more equal footing for wider ranges of people and groups to have discus-
sions about the future of global capitalism. The potential for dire human costs of
deepening global financial, social, and ecological crises leads to a support for the
idea that there is the need to have more wide ranging discussions about the nature
of global capitalism and global governance rather than have no effective global
governance. A more deliberative G20 could be one suitable place for such discussions.
There are also questions about the ways that NGOs can distort or coopt the
causes that NGOs seek to represent.75 Critical deliberative approaches make no
claim that NGOs are perfect in this regard, but claim that by bringing particular
voices and discourses into global governance bodies they provide a crucial political
function. Critical deliberative approaches seek to build upon this development. John
Dryzek’s position of discursive democracy identifies a way of representing discourses
such as neo-liberalism, environmentalism, and social justice, for example.76 This
branch of deliberative democracy theory claims that in some contexts it is more
possible to evenly represent the extant discourses of a given public than people,
maybe even having a ‘Chamber of Discourses’ to rest alongside electoral forms of
representation.77 Even in an informal sense the current role of NGOs as democratic
representers of discourses could play a democratic role:
Is the world any more democratic for their activities? Clearly, yes, the international govern-
mental institutions they target now have to justify their activities in light of a variety of
discourses, whereas previously they either felt no need to justify at all, or did so in narrowly
economistic and administrative terms. Thus, the idea of discursive representation provides
democratic validation for the activities of NGOs and other transnational activists.78
Although there are practical questions with respect to who represents discourses and
how these representers are selected, this form of democracy has considerable merit.
While the core goal of deliberative accountability is the more modest goal of ensuring
deliberations are sincere, transparent, and responsive so as to improve the legitimacy
and effectiveness of the G20, discursive representation identifies a systematic way
of representing a wider array of perspectives. Whether discourses are represented
formally or not, deliberative approaches systematically widen the circle of voices
involved in political practice.
75 Bob, ‘Merchants of Morality’.
76 Dryzek, Deliberative Global Politics.
77 Dryzek and Niemeyer, ‘Discursive Representation’, p. 485.
78 Ibid., p. 491.
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A third and most important problem is considering how various public con-
stituencies of deliberation and accountability intersect with each other. Keohane
argues for a ‘pluralistic accountability system’ which supports various types of
accountability given the decentralised and pluralist nature of governance in world
politics.79 This is justifiable in a practical sense as national accountability to the
publics of member states, cosmopolitan accountability to those affected, or the
transnational accountability of NGOs and social movements are all imperfect but
all better than no public accountability at all. Given the difficulty of developing
accountable or democratic structures in world politics, all forms of accountability
should be encouraged in order to develop overlapping structures than enable various
forms of public engagement which aspires to encourage leaders at G20 meetings to
be more responsive for the declarations they make. However, the central problem
within the array of different forms of accountability is which form of accountability
should be dominant in cases of differences between these forms? As Keohane indicates,
the central problem of accountability is not whether accountability mechanisms exist
but whom should these mechanisms be accountable to.80 Which constituency of
accountability should be overriding? This question is a practical and normative
question – whose voice should prevail when there is clash between national, cosmo-
politan, and transnational forms of accountability?
In contrast, deliberative theory can be seen to provide a productive account of
how national accountability can intersect with transnational and cosmopolitan forms
of accountability in respect to the G20. An important implication drawn from the
deliberative approach is that deliberation is not just a matter of shaping policies and
institutions but also plays a key role in the creation and transformation of publics
and public spheres. A public sphere and the notion of ‘publicness’ relates to a
domain of information, debate, and effect that transcends institutions.81 Account-
ability moves a public constituency away from a ‘weak’ conception of being public
which rests upon a moral influence, to a stronger conception of being public which
entails a systematic political influence where formal reasons are given for decisions.82
Importantly, deliberative scholars emphasise that deliberation not only constitutes
and creates specific publics and public spheres but also that deliberation can actually
transform these conceptions.83 In reference to the multiplicity of publics that relate to
the accountability of the G20, it is apparent that deliberation would challenge any
notion that national, cosmopolitan, and transnational forms of public are hermeti-
cally sealed. Instead deliberation opens up the possibility for agents to draw upon
other publics for information or resources to hold leaders to account. While the
further development of cosmopolitan and transnational public spheres would be
an important advance in global politics, the development of deliberative inspired
national public spheres within G20 member states which seek to hold their leaders
to account would also be a significant development.
79 Keohane, ‘Accountability’, p. 84.
80 Keohane, ‘Global Governance’, p. 146.
81 Brassett and Smith, ‘Deliberation and Global Governance’, p. 499.
82 Ibid., pp. 500–1.
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Deliberation within a national public sphere could open up a significant array of
possibilities. This could mean that citizens of a nation state ensure that their parlia-
ments are playing a reasonable and productive role that intersects with a cosmopolitan
perspective or is receptive to the views of NGOs. Such policymaking could require
parliaments and citizens to consider the welfare of people who live in other states.
This means that effective public scrutiny of G20 deliberation will have to come
from citizens operating within their domestic political systems, and in the formation
and operation of NGO and social movements in the form of transnational account-
ability, which provides agency to excluded voices and some capacity to attempt to
hold the G20 and its member states to their declarations. What is possible given the
importance of deliberation to accountability and the rising profile of NGOs is that
NGOs could, over time, introduce cosmopolitan concerns into national forms of
accountability. Once citizens are considering national accountability more fully
there will be greater opportunities for transnational NGOs to intrude into national
deliberations. Although imperfect, the existence of transnational civil society offers
strong opportunity for enhanced accountability and deliberative governance both in
terms of being able to play a role ‘educating publics about the nature and terms of
dominant discourses’ but also as an ‘affective arena’ able to shape perceptions
of key global issues by virtue of the diversity of political perspectives within this
arena.84 Nevertheless, we need to build upon existing forms of accountability as
well as develop new forms of accountability wherever possible. While augmented
forms of accountability and deliberation with respect to the G20 will not automati-
cally solve global problems like climate change, they will enable faster forms of
learning and a more reflective consideration of international policymaking.
Globalisation and the limitations of G20 accountability
It is naı¨ve to suggest that cosmopolitan or transnational accountability will be manifest
in the near term to hold states accountable in a way that supplants the formal account-
ability of a G20 state’s government to its public.85 Nevertheless, it is equally naı¨ve to
suggest that the G20, and global governance more generally, can maintain legitimacy
in a globalising world without engaging in mutual communication with transnational
actors and those people around the world affected by G20 decision-making. Further-
more, while the G20 has demonstrated its capacity to be an effective ‘crisis committee’
in the face of global crises, there are fears that international cooperation ‘could subside
without collective purpose.86 Such collective purpose should not be generated only
by global emergencies but also by public inputs and deliberations. Deliberative
accountability is one measure that could strengthen the G20’s capacity to be a forum
able to pre-empt global problems.
Hence it is important to consider some serious practical limitations to these
conceptions of accountability in respect to the G20. First, the most immediate and
overarching challenge to making the G20 more accountable is the designed separa-
tion of the ‘G’ system from public attention. From the outset the deliberation of the
84 Ibid., p. 418. See also Keck and Sikkink, ‘Activists’, chap. 1.
85 Keohane, ‘Global Governance’, p. 152.
86 Cooper and Bradford, The G20, p. 5.
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various summits were designed to be outside public view.87 The discussions of leaders
at these forums are informal and more about ideas and aspiration than concrete pro-
cesses and outcomes. However, the purposefully secretive and unaccountable nature
of the ‘G’ system forums could be considered to be positive and ‘the point’ of ‘G’
system meetings. The informal nature of the ‘G’ system could be the reason that
world leaders actively participate and use these forums to attempt to develop re-
sponses to global problems. So the counterpoint to attempts to develop greater form
of accountability is that we should avoid undermining the reason that the ‘G’ system
exists. A response to this claim is that the type of accountability argued for here is
focused upon communication and learning and is not trying to hold all of the leaders
of member states morally and legally responsible for every public utterance. Further-
more, given the importance and sensitivity of global forms of integration, it is
difficult to see how the G20 can persist in being an informal and casual forum in
global governance.88 The influence that the G system has exerted and the possibility
that the G20 could address global problems and provide global public goods means
that the G20 needs to be legitimate in order to be effective. This means that signifi-
cant forms of accountability will be required – even if this puts G20 deliberations
under more formalised scrutiny.
In addition, there are examples where ‘G’ leaders have used their influence to
articulate a purpose or agenda not stemming from a narrow self-interested conception
of their national interests, but an agenda stemming from their national constituency
or transnational activism. This has happened most often by leaders who are those
chairing a meeting of the G8 or G20 and use their agenda setting discretion to
advance particular issues which often go beyond the economic agenda of the ‘G’
system.89 A high profile example of this occurred at the 2005 Gleneagles G8 meeting
when the British prime minister Tony Blair advanced the issue of poverty in Africa.
This was a result of the Make Poverty History Campaign which included the Live8
concerts conducted around the world on 2 July 2005. On the 7 July the G8 leaders
pledged to increase levels of aid to poor nations from US $25 to US $50 billion by
2010 with half of this money going to Africa.90 So the G8 could be seen to be respon-
sive here, but given the funds have not been fully articulated, the issue remains as to
how the leaders of the G8 can be held to these commitments. Nevertheless, this
points to the latent potential of the G20 to be a forum that addresses global social
problems.
Secondly, efforts to promote national accountability can be considered prob-
lematic because there are significant questions about the sufficiency of parliamentary
democracy to keep leaders to account for their commitments at G8 or G20 meetings.
It is no longer reasonable to claim that states are able to exercise unrestricted authority
within their territory given the rising salience of transnational interconnections.91
There is also evidence that in many countries, parliaments or parliamentary com-
mittees do not have sustained processes to keep leaders at ‘G’ system meetings to
account. Furthermore, the capacity of such measures to be proactive and not reactive
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is doubtful. As Michael Hammer, drawing on the research of the One World Trust in
several countries, claims ‘today, Parliaments mostly lack the capacity and established
mechanisms that would enable them to conduct effective oversight of government
action and progress on the G20 programme of work’.92 Thus even in the strict sense
of national accountability there currently appear to be limitations to developing
stronger forms of accountability. This points to the need to consider deliberative
forms of political practice and also consider further forms of accountability that exist
outside of existing systems of formal parliamentary oversight.
Third, accountability is difficult to maintain because some countries may have
domestic political constituencies or a political history that demonstrates a reluctance
to engage with global governance in respect to particular issues, or indeed with estab-
lishing systematic forms of accountability. It is important to be aware of the limita-
tions of the power and discretion of leaders operating in summits of the G8 and G20.
Essentially the public or particular constituencies within particular states can play a
blocking role to their states’ contribution to international efforts to address specific
issues, or to strengthen global commitments or governance structures to address these
issues. While most countries have a reasonable level of public support for global
governance, especially as globalisation continues to tie countries together in practical
terms, such support is by no means guaranteed – especially in times of economic
hardship. Also, some G20 member states clearly do not possess a political culture
which embraces democratic or civil society practices and are, therefore, unlikely to
immediately embrace accountability of their leaders – even in a deliberative form.
In essence, like most forms of cooperation, the G8 or G20 tends to be limited by its
members, and efforts to promote deliberative accountability may not be consistent
across member states. Nevertheless, because all member states of the G20 have
a strong vested interest in benefitting from the status quo, they have an underlying
interest in stabilising globalisation and thus it is crucial that global governance
forums like the G20 exist and have a strong degree of public legitimacy.
While public deliberation underpins the account developed here, concerns remain
over the prospects of public deliberation and accountability in global politics. In
particular, even those supportive of the deliberative approach agree that deliberation
should not undermine effective action and cooperation in forums like the G20. The
nub of this concern is how can we ‘widen the circle of stakeholders sufficiently to
promote a healthy dialogue’ in a way ‘that does not impede effective action’.93 In
addition, the public legitimacy of the G20 should not undermine the international
legitimacy of states in global politics. While it is the case that international legitimacy
depends upon public legitimacy and support, it remains the case that some member
states of the G20 will not support greater forms of accountability and that some
states outside the G20 will remain concerned about the exclusion of many states.
This article has sought to counter these concerns by focusing upon the notion of
deliberative accountability, which seeks to create systematic forms of responsiveness
on the part of world leaders that goes beyond citizens or NGOs merely putting moral
pressure on G20 leaders – but falling short of judicial accountability. The expecta-
tion here is that international legitimacy would be enhanced by increased public
legitimacy within member states of the G20 and entrenching the G20 more into these
92 Hammer, ‘The time is now’, p. 1.
93 Germain, ‘Financial Governance’, p. 509.
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societies. Deliberative accountability could also enable the creation of overlapping
public spheres which would create opportunities for the consideration of views of
those outside the G20 states – as discussed above. Not all states will accept the
same forms of deliberation and accountability. The forms of public deliberation
argued for here should augment and not undermine the capacity of the G20 to
respond to global problems.
Conclusion
The central argument of this article is that the G20 could be developed as a site for
public deliberation – an ‘institutional anchor’ – for overlapping forms of deliberative
accountability. The central benefit of this accountability would be to strengthen the
public legitimacy of the G20. Without avenues of accountability, questions regarding
the suitability and future of the G20 will likely continue and increase. Deliberative
accountability can guide G20 leaders to make better decisions which take account
of wider sources of information and voices. The key element of deliberative account-
ability is the idea of responsiveness – that G20 leaders should be responsive in terms
of giving reasons for policy direction, respond to public inputs and be willing to learn
from the social impact of G20 determinations. This avoids the shadowy nature of the
deliberations of the ‘G’ system across its variegated history. Such a call for greater
accountability implies the development of a more formal G20 which could well
involve the formation of an ongoing secretariat. Indeed, the expanding ambit and
increasing impact of the G20 and the potential of world leaders to address global
problems are too significant for the G20 to merely be a shadowy and informal
‘talk fest’. The G20’s ‘plate spinning’ role of policy coordination remains absolutely
crucial to effective global governance as there especially needs to be consideration of
policy coordination of governments around the world where various policy regimes
intersect. Executive level policy deliberation and coordination will continue to grow
in importance with deepening economic and social integration.
Nevertheless both accountability and deliberation are difficult of foster on national,
cosmopolitan, and transnational scales. This article has indicated a series of challeng-
ing questions that critical deliberative approaches are attempting to address. These
problems include considering how various forms of deliberation and accountability
intersect with each other to shape international institutions and policies, how trans-
national NGOs can productively interface with democratic systems in nation states
and whether and to what degree can transnational and cosmopolitan forms of
accountability and deliberation transform notions of what is public within national
political systems. While this position of deliberation with respect to global gover-
nance can be charged with claims of being idealistic and improbable, the sober fact
is that global forms of democracy or world government are even more open to this
charge. Attempts to develop deliberation with respect to global governance bodies
and global politics more generally are inherently more pragmatic than attempts to
create a world government. Consequently, in order for more responsive forms of
global governance to emerge that can effectively address global problems, motivated
citizens from within the societies of G20 members and within transnational civil
society will have to be the agents that demand higher levels and further avenues of
accountability. Only then will the G20 be a forum that does more than promise the
world in respect to global issues.
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